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Comparative Value-relevance of GAAP, IBES, S&P Core, Cash 





This study examines the impact the global financial crisis had on the value relevance of 
GAAP and non-GAAP earnings. We adopt the Ohlson (1995) valuation and CAR models to 
test the value relevance and information content of alternative earnings measures. We use six 
different earnings measures comprising IBES earnings, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) core 
earnings, cash earnings, cash flows from operations, earnings from operations adjusted to 
exclude special items under GAAP and income before extraordinary items under GAAP. We 
draw our sample from US publicly traded firms between 2002 and 2010. Our sample is 
partitioned into Financial and non-Financial firms, and S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 firms. The 
results show that investors place greater value relevance on GAAP earnings during the GFC 











There is much research on the information content and value relevance of earnings measures 
based on generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) relative to non-GAAP measures. 
Prior research (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Doyle et al., 2003; 
Lougee and Marquardt, 2004) finds that non-GAAP earnings (e.g., street, pro forma or IBES 
earnings) are significantly more value relevant and informative relative to GAAP earnings. 
Much of this evidence, however, is based on samples from before 2006, i.e., before the global 
financial crisis (GFC). Consequently, these studies do not investigate the impact of the GFC 
on the value relevance or informativeness of non-GAAP earnings relative to GAAP earnings. 
Albring et al. (2010), however, covers the period 2002 to 2007 in their study, which includes 
the beginning of the GFC. Nevertheless, they did not investigate the impact of the GFC. To 
the best of our knowledge, there is no research on the value relevance of these earnings 
metrics post-2006 after the GFC, during which period there is increased focus on the 
reliability of earnings information. Further, the GFC has created a climate of volatility and 
uncertainty in the capital market that may impact on how investors perceive the credibility 
and value relevance of earnings, and the sources from which they are produced. Prior to the 
GFC, there had been concerns with pro forma earnings, specifically with the quality of the 
information and the potential for it to be biased given management’s vested interests. This led 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) instituting regulations limiting the use of 
non-GAAP earnings metrics (SEC, 2001; SEC, 2002). Nevertheless, security analysts 
tracking services (e.g., IBES and First Call) continue to produce their own measures of 
earnings and credit rating agencies also produce their own earnings measures (e.g., Moody’s 
and Standard and Poor’s).  Given the greater scrutiny of non-GAAP earnings since 2002 and 
the impact of the GFC, an important research question is: Do investors continue to place 
greater value relevance on non-GAAP earnings measures relative to GAAP earnings? 
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Generally, pro forma earnings are produced by firms to supplement their reported GAAP 
earnings, while street and IBES earnings are produced by analysts. Non-GAAP earnings are 
generally more selective than GAAP earnings in that “other non-operating” items are 
excluded and these earnings are argued to better represent continuing performance. Bowen et 
al. (2005) provide evidence that firms tend to place greater relative emphasis on pro forma 
earnings when they have less value relevant GAAP earnings. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) 
estimate that while only a small proportion of firms report any pro forma or non-GAAP 
figures between 1998 and 2000, the number of firms doing so increased during this period. In 
a subsequent study, Bhattacharya et al. (2007) report an increase in pro forma reporting from 
1998 until 2001 followed by a dramatic drop in the third quarter of 2002 coinciding with the 
enactment of SOX in July 2002. Doyle et al. (2003) suggest that the market may misprice 
stock or be misled by pro forma earnings, while Johnson and Schwartz (2005) report results 
that do not support this view. 
These studies focus primarily on earnings measures produced either by the firm (GAAP and 
pro forma earnings) or security analysts (street and IBES earnings). On the other hand, credit 
rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s (S&P) also provide credible alternative 
information to capital markets. The credit ratings issued by these agencies are extremely 
important as they represent an independent evaluation of firms’ default risks (Graham and 
Harvey, 2001; Gray et al., 2006). Credit rating agencies also produce their own alternative 
measures of earnings. It is conceivable that earnings measures produced by credit rating 
agencies are value relevant given the role of credit agencies in financial markets. 
Nevertheless, there have been concerns that credit rating agencies bear strong responsibility 
for contributing to the subprime crisis through being lax in the ratings of some structured 
finance products. Consequently, it is questionable whether credit rating agencies are 
5 
 
unbiased.1 Measures of earnings by credit agencies, however, have received little attention in 
the GAAP vs Street literature.  
Our study examines the impact of the GFC on the value relevance and informativeness of 
GAAP earnings and several measures of non-GAAP earnings. We also separately examine 
firms in the financial and non-financial sector, and firms included in the S&P 500 index and 
firms not included in the S&P 500 index. We provide evidence and insight on the impact the 
financial sector and firm size may have on the value relevance of these earnings measures. 
Our study differs from prior studies in several aspects. The first contribution of our study is 
the investigation of whether the GFC had an impact on the value relevance of GAAP earnings 
relative to non-GAAP earnings. The GFC offers a unique opportunity to investigate how 
investors may manage the trade-offs between the reliability of GAAP earnings and non-
GAAP earnings. Research conducted before the GFC generally finds that non-GAAP 
earnings are significantly more value relevant and informative relative to GAAP earnings 
(Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Doyle et al., 2003; Lougee and 
Marquardt, 2004). However, the increased uncertainty and volatility in capital markets post-
GFC suggest that investors may not only be seeking better quality information but also more 
reliable and credible information, which are the stated advantages of GAAP reporting. As a 
consequence, investors may place greater emphasis on GAAP earnings in periods of 
uncertainty. In addition, GAAP earnings are subject to an audit, which lends reasonable 
assurance that they are fairly presented in accordance with the GAAP reporting framework.  
Therefore, we investigate whether there is a shift in investor focus from non-GAAP to GAAP 
                                                
1 The literature suggests that credit rating agencies may inflate ratings, however, under certain conditions, 
regulations (Stolper, 2009) and reputational effects (Mathis et al., 2009) may provide incentives for agencies to 
assign correct ratings. Interestingly, Bolton et al. (2012) demonstrate that a monopoly is generally more efficient 
than a duopoly in inducing higher ratings quality as the latter provide more opportunities for an issuer to shop for 
a good rating. 
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earnings during the post-GFC period. No prior research has investigated the value relevance 
of GAAP and non-GAAP earnings post-GFC relative to pre-GFC. 
Second, our study adopts a more comprehensive approach to investigate the comparative 
value relevance of GAAP and non-GAAP earnings. Prior studies generally use a single 
measure of GAAP earnings to compare with street earnings, typically IBES earnings. In this 
study, we compare several alternative measures of earnings. These earnings measures include 
two alternative measures of GAAP earnings (earnings from operations adjusted to exclude 
special items and income before extraordinary items, which are used separately in prior 
literature), IBES earnings, Standard and Poor’s core earnings, cash earnings and operating 
cash flows. We explicitly test the value relevance of these measures and provide a more 
comprehensive estimation of their comparative value relevance.  
A further contribution of our study is the examination of the value relevance of earnings 
measures published by a credible third party such as a credit rating agency. A credit rating 
agency is in a unique position as an information provider in that it not only produces an 
alternative measure of earnings but it also issues credit ratings for firms. Credit rating 
agencies, unlike analysts, are more concerned with firms’ going concern positions than 
analysts. These credit ratings signal firms’ credit worthiness and have implications for firms’ 
future performance and their management of debt. As such, credit rating agencies are likely to 
be more conservative and more risk averse than analysts (Batta and Muslu, 2010) and, 
therefore, are likely to measure earnings more conservatively than managers. In 2001, 
Standard & Poor’s proposed its core earnings measure as an alternative to GAAP earnings. 
Their core earnings represents a measure favoured by the credit agency. Further, it allows a 
comparison against alternative measures of earnings as the method of measuring core 




Unlike Albring et al. (2010), which also investigate the value relevance of Standard & Poor’s 
core earnings measure relative to GAAP and IBES earnings, the sample in our study is not 
restricted to firms in the S&P 500 index. Large firms, by virtue of size, generally have more 
publicly available information relative to small firms, which may impact how investors value 
the different measures of earnings. For example, large firms tend to have more analysts 
following them and more media coverage. In contrast, there may be limited alternative 
sources of information for smaller firms, which may impact the reliance and relevance that 
investors place on GAAP earnings, a mandated source of information irrespective of size. No 
other study investigates the impact of size on the value relevance and informativeness of 
GAAP and non-GAAP earnings pre-GFC and post-GFC. 
Finally, a key trigger of the GFC stems from the crisis in the financial sector where the quality 
and reliability of financial information has since been shown to be questionable. Prior 
research generally excludes firms in the financial sector. Therefore, in addition to 
investigating the value relevance and informativeness of GAAP and non-GAAP earnings in 
the non-financial sector, we also investigate the impact the GFC may have had on the value 
relevance and informativeness of earnings of firms in the financial sector. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature. Section 
3 describes our research design, sample and data. Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 
presents a summary of our findings and our conclusions. 
2 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
It is well documented that stock prices are closely related to earnings performance, and that 
earnings are generally superior in explaining stock prices relative to cash flows (Dechow, 
1994; Sloan, 1996). Further, there is increasingly greater emphasis on non-transitory earnings 
as a more informative measure of earnings performance. In this regard, research shows that 
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non-GAAP earnings measures are generally more value relevant than GAAP earnings 
measures (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Brown and Sivakumar, 2003; Bowen et al., 2005; 
Lougee and Marquardt, 2004). Defond and Hung (2003) argue that cash flows are 
incrementally useful and complement value relevant information contained in earnings. Their 
results suggest that cash flow forecasts are value relevant and provide market participants 
with an alternative source of information relative to earnings. Further, cash flows are 
potentially less subjective than earnings due to the impact of accruals on earnings. 
Studies investigating the value-relevance and informativeness of alternative earnings metrics 
to GAAP earnings generally focus on IBES and pro forma earnings. More recently, however, 
researchers (Albring et al., 2010; Batta and Muslu, 2010) have begun to investigate measures 
of earnings published by credit rating agencies. Credit rating agencies, similar to 
stockbrokers, financial analysts and the financial press, represent alternative sources of 
information used by stakeholders. Prior studies show that these sources provide information 
that is value relevant (Best and Zhang, 1993). 
The trade off between relevance and reliability, however, is an issue when a variety of 
information sources exist and when credible information (e.g., audited annual reports) is not 
available immediately. Atiase et al. (2005) show that while investors have a preference for 
reliability, it is possible that they may also seek relevant information from alternative credible 
sources that is not as reliable as audited financial information. Best and Zhang (1993, p. 1508) 
argue “that parties other than banks also perform evaluation and monitoring roles”. Therefore, 
investors may seek information from other providers such as credit rating agencies that 
perform evaluation and monitoring roles (Vassalou and Xing, 2003). 
Results from the few studies on the value relevance of earnings measures produced by credit 
rating agencies are mixed. Albring et al. (2010) investigate the value relevance of Standard & 
Poor’s core earnings measure. They find that core earnings are more value relevant than 
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GAAP earnings. In contrast, Robinson et al. (2008) in Albring et al. (2010, p. 268) report that 
“S&P core earnings are not a more useful measure relative to GAAP earnings.” Batta and 
Muslu (2010) find evidence of conservatism in the non-GAAP earnings published by the 
credit rating agency Moody’s and that these earnings are informative about the credit risk of 
underlying firms. 
Firms can reduce information asymmetry confronting investors through the voluntary 
disclosure of information. The obvious implication of this is that management has vested 
interests in the information disclosed and the information is likely to be biased. On the other 
hand, agency theory also suggests that management has incentives to provide quality 
information as high quality information leads to better rewards. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that over a period of time prior to 2002, there was a documented increase in the release of pro 
forma earnings by firms (Bhattacharya et al., 2003). However, a number of significant 
corporate collapses in the early 2000s raised questions about the quality of reported earnings 
and performance information as disclosed by firms in their pro forma earnings releases, which 
in 2001 led to the SEC issuing cautionary advice regarding the use of "pro forma" financial 
information in earnings releases (SEC, 2001) and in 2002, the SEC issued regulations on the 
use of non-GAAP earnings (SEC, 2002). Also, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) regulating 
financial reporting and corporate governance was enacted in the wake of the Enron scandal, 
which required higher standards of corporate governance. These regulatory changes mean that 
how corporate earnings are measured and disclosed are now under greater scrutiny.  
Prior studies on the information content of accounting earnings and cash flows generally 
cover the period before 2002. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) reports an increase in pro forma 
earnings releases from 181 in 1998 to 695 in 2000. Since the SEC imposed new regulations 
on the use on non-GAAP earnings in 2002 (SEC, 2002), there is a discernible shift away from 
pro forma earnings to a more conservative earnings metric that removes the effects of 
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transitory earnings. This could be due to concerns about earnings management and 
managerial opportunism in respect to non-GAAP earnings. As firms may provide additional 
disclosures via pro forma earnings, these disclosures may be a tool for firms to influence 
stakeholders’ perceptions of firm performance. Bowen et al. (2005) investigate the emphasis 
firms place on pro forma and GAAP earnings within quarterly press releases in the period 
2001-2002 and find evidence that firms tend to place greater relative emphasis on pro forma 
earnings when they have less value relevant GAAP earnings. Also, they observe a shift in 
emphasis away from pro forma earnings between 2001 and 2002. Bhattacharya et al. (2007) 
find an increase in pro forma reporting from 1998 until 2001, but it decreased after 2001. 
There was a dramatic drop in the third quarter of 2002 coinciding with the enactment of SOX, 
which requires explicit reconciliation between pro forma and GAAP earnings, in July of that 
year. Interestingly, Johnson and Schwartz (2005) find that investors, on average, do not 
appear to be misled by pro forma figures. This is consistent with Lougee and Marquardt 
(2004), who find that pro forma earnings have relative and incremental information content 
when GAAP earnings informativeness is low in their sample of firms, from 1997 to 1999, that 
release pro forma earnings. Unsurprisingly, they also find that firms emphasise the metric that 
portrays firm performance more favourably.  
Interestingly, the findings of Bowen et al. (2005) that the level of emphasis on pro forma 
earnings decreased and the level of emphasis on GAAP earnings increased in 2002 relative to 
2001 coincided with the greater scrutiny by the SEC following several corporate and 
accounting scandals. From a stock market perspective, their results show that pro forma 
earnings are value relevant. While there is some indication of value relevance in respect to 
emphasis on GAAP earnings, the results are weak. 
Studies provide evidence that SOX was a pivotal moment in regulatory reform causing a 
reversion to more conservative reporting and greater awareness of potential earnings 
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management. Lobo and Zhou (2006) provide evidence that, post-SOX, firms are, on average, 
more conservative (using the conservatism measure of Basu, 1997) in their financial 
reporting, i.e., firms are quicker to incorporate losses than gains when reporting earnings. 
They also report a significant reduction in discretionary accruals post-SOX relative to pre-
SOX periods. Lobo and Zhou, however, did not test for value relevance. Marques (2006) 
reports a decline in the probability of disclosing non-GAAP financial measures in 2003. 
An alternative explanation for the move towards a more conservative measure of earnings and 
away from non-GAAP earnings measure may be that market participants are seeking more 
credible information (Lobo and Zhou, 2006; Marques, 2006). Credit rating agencies, with 
incentives to be conservative, may be this alternative source of information. The core earnings 
measures advocated by Standard and Poor’s may be perceived to be more credible and value 
relevant relative to other non-GAAP earnings. It may be argued that this core earnings 
measure is also more conservative and more closely reflects permanent earnings as the 
adjustments include items that are typically included in special items as well as those that are 
not generally accounted for under GAAP. Further, S&P explicitly detail what these 
adjustments are. Blitzer et al. (2002) specify the adjustments to GAAP earnings when 
computing core earnings, which is defined as focused ‘on a company’s ongoing 
operations…(and) should include all the revenues and costs associated with those operations 
and exclude revenues or costs that arise in other parts of the business, such as unrealised gains 
or losses from hedging activities’ (p. 5). Items such as employee stock option grant expense, 
restructuring charges from ongoing operations, and pension costs are included in computing 
core earnings. On the other hand, items such as goodwill impairment charges, gains/losses 
from asset sales, and unrealised gains/losses from hedging activities are specifically excluded 
from the computation. Albring et al. (2010) report results consistent with this in their study of 
firms in the S&P 500 index over the period 2002 to 2007. They find that Standard and Poor’s 
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core earnings are significantly more value relevant than both GAAP earnings and IBES 
earnings. 
While prior studies indicate operating cash flows are inferior to earnings in explaining stock 
prices, Dechow (1994) and Defond and Hung (2003) provide evidence that operating cash 
flows are value relevant. These findings suggest that cash flows contain information that 
complement the information contained in earnings. As “cash flows are potentially less 
subjective than accruals…(they) help market participants assess firm viability by providing 
information about solvency and liquidity (Defond and Hung, 2003, p. 75). Also, the 
complementary information in cash flows is consistent with the evidence that investors may 
not comprehend fully the information presented in earnings and are subsequently surprised 
when non-recurring items recur in subsequent years, or when pro forma earnings miss 
earnings benchmarks (McVay, 2006; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004). If earnings measures that 
are less conservative than GAAP earnings can be used to mislead investors or are susceptible 
to earnings management, it is conceivable that more conservative earnings measures may 
have information content (Basu, 1997; Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Ryan and Zarowin, 2003). 
At the extreme, cash flows represent the most conservative measure of performance – it 
reflects objective evidence that the transaction has occurred and cash transfers completed. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that under an accrual accounting system, “if unrealized losses but 
not unrealized gains are recognized, then earnings is more conservative than cash flow” 
(Basu, 1997, p. 16). Additionally, an alternative performance measure such as cash flows 
from operations, which is not subject to accruals manipulation, may also be value relevant as 
there is evidence that special items adjustments are related more with accruals than cash flows 
(Doyle et al., 2003) and that managers may be manipulating real activities to meet earnings 
targets or to avoid reporting annual losses. 
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Mandatory GAAP earnings are also required to be audited and would provide greater 
credibility and reliability. In light of the GFC, we expect investors to seek increasingly more 
reliable and conservative financial information. Therefore, we expect to observe greater value 
relevance in earnings measures that are perceived to be more reliable and conservative in the 
post-GFC period relative to the pre-GFC period. 
The results from the various studies on pro forma earnings are consistent in showing that pro 
forma earnings and IBES earnings are more value relevant when compared to GAAP earnings 
(Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Doyle et al., 2003). While there has been a decline in pro forma 
earnings releases, there is evidence that there has been an increase in the quality of other 
exclusions, i.e., more transitory items, and a decrease in the quality of special items (Kolev et 
al., 2008). This suggests earnings management may not necessarily have decreased, but rather 
managers have changed the way they manage earnings from managing accruals to managing 
real activities (Roychowdhury, 2006) and classification shifting (McVay, 2006). Further, with 
the exception of Albring et al. (2010), these studies typically focus on only two primary 
sources of information - information produced by analysts and management. Blitzer et al. 
(2002) argue that Standard and Poor’s core earnings better represent permanent earnings. 
Whether this is so is an empirical question. While the superiority of non-GAAP earnings over 
GAAP earnings are well-established in the literature, there are still gaps in the literature. 
3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
3.1 Empirical Models 
To measure value relevance, our study adopts the Ohlson (1995; 1999) valuation model where 
firm value is a function of book value of equity and earnings. This model can also include 
factors that are considered “as ‘background’ information that influences value without 
violating the idea that accounting data provide kernel information” (Ohlson, 1999, p. 156). 
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We adapt the model to include a non-GAAP and a GAAP measure of earnings to test the 
incremental value relevance of earnings.  
We investigate four non-GAAP measures of earnings. We use the earnings reported by 
analysts in IBES. Thomson Reuters (2009, p. 35) states that IBES earnings per share is 
defined as “the EPS that the contributing analyst considers to be that with which to value a 
security. This figure may include or exclude certain items depending on the contributing 
analyst’s specific model.” While this definition is ambiguous, the measure has been used 
extensively in prior studies and is understood to include adjustments to reported profits for 
nonrecurring items. The computation of the measure, however, may not be consistent across 
firms. Another earnings measure of interest is S&P’s core earnings measure, which represents 
an alternative to GAAP earnings. Unlike IBES earnings, this measure is explicitly defined in 
Blitzer et al. (2002). The third non-GAAP measure of earnings is cash earnings, which is 
measured as net income before adjustments for depreciation and amortisation (i.e., long term 
accruals). This is a measure commonly used in the financial press. This measure, unlike cash 
flows from operations, does include the effects of certain accruals. Finally, we also examine 
cash flows from operations. 
We also examine two different measures of GAAP earnings commonly used in prior studies - 
earnings from operations adjusted to exclude special items (GAAP1) and income before 
extraordinary items (GAAP2). Both earnings measures are argued to represent earnings from 
continuing operations. GAAP1 represents earnings adjusted to exclude the effects of special 
items and is a measure similar to IBES and S&P core earnings.  
Additionally, we include earnings forecast as a control variable for investors’ expectation of 
earnings. Consistent with prior studies, the general forms of the OLS regression models are: 
  Pit =α0 +β1BVit +β2Forecastit +β3NonGAAPEit +β4DIFF1+εit  (1) 
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  Pit =α0 +β1BVit +β2Forecastit +β3NonGAAPEit +β4DIFF2+εit  (2) 
where Pit is the closing share price for firm i at time t, BVit is the book value per share of firm 
i at time t, Forecastit is the median consensus security analysts’ forecast of earnings per share 
for firm i at time t, NonGAAPEit is the non-GAAP earnings measure of interest for firm i at 
time t, DIFF1it is GAAP1 minus the non-GAAP earnings measure of interest for firm i at time 
t, DIFF2it is GAAP2 minus non-GAAP earnings measure of interest for firm i at time t. All 
variables are measured on a per share basis. The model provides direct empirical evidence of 
whether GAAP earnings have significant incremental value relevance over non-GAAP 
earnings. A statistically significant  β4 , which measures the difference between GAAP and 
non-GAAP earnings, indicates that GAAP earnings has incremental value relevance.  
Also, we regress short-window cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) on earnings surprise 
measures based on each GAAP and non-GAAP earnings metrics to examine the information 
content of earnings (Brown and Sivakumar, 2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2003). The general 
forms of the OLS regression models are: 
 CARi =α0 +β1ESNonGAAPi +β2ESGAAP1i +εi  (3)
 
 CARi =α0 +β1ESNonGAAPi +β2ESGAAP2i +εi  (4)
 
where CARi is the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns for firm i over a three-day 
window (t-1 to t+1) centred around the earnings announcement date (t = 0), ESNonGAAPi is 
the non-GAAP earnings surprise for firm i, defined as the difference between the actual non-
GAAP earnings measure of interest and the median consensus security analysts’ forecast of 
earnings scaled by the closing share price at t-7, ESGAAP1i is the GAAP earnings surprise for 
firm i, defined as the difference between the actual GAAP1 earnings and the median 
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consensus security analysts’ forecast of earnings scaled by the closing share price at t-7 and 
ESGAAP2i is the GAAP earnings surprise for firm i, defined as the difference between the 
actual GAAP2 earnings and the median consensus security analysts’ forecast of earnings 
scaled by the closing share price at t-7. All earnings are measured on a per share basis. 
Ideally, earnings surprise should be measured as the difference between actual and expected 
earnings for a particular earnings metric. However, forecasts for earnings metrics other than 
analysts’ earnings metric (e.g., IBES) are generally not available. Using forecasts of IBES 
earnings to measure earnings surprise result with noisy measures and the classic errors in 
variables problems (Cohen et al., 2007). Nevertheless, IBES forecast is a proxy of 
information available to the market and an indication of investors’ earnings expectation. Prior 
studies are also subject to this limitation, which biases the results in favour of finding 
significance in IBES earnings relative to other earnings metrics (Bradshaw, 2011).
 
Our sample comprises two periods: pre-GFC and post-GFC. We consider the post-GFC 
period to begin from 2007. For each period, we test our models on samples that consist of 
firms included in the S&P 500 index (S&P 500) versus firms that are not included in order to 
investigate the relative impact on large and small firms. Also, as a key trigger of the GFC 
stems from the financial sector, we test our models on firms that are classified under this 
sector using GICS (code 40).    
The sample is in the form of panel data and the assumptions of OLS regression may not hold. 
Further, there is evidence that a pooled OLS approach can lead to biased standard errors when 
the sample is a panel data set (Petersen, 2009; Gow et al., 2010). Therefore, we adopt the 




We use the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for model selection and to evaluate the 
relative performance of these models.2 A lower value of BIC is preferable and the model with 
the lowest value of BIC is the best fitting model. BIC, however, does not indicate if the 
models are significantly different from each other. Prior studies generally rely on the 
approach in Vuong (1989) for model selection and test of statistical significance. However, 
this test is not appropriate in our study where the standard errors are clustered. Also, the value 
of the earnings coefficients and their significance provide direct evidence of their value 
relevance and information content. 
3.2 Sample Selection 
Our sample consists of all US publicly traded firms from Compustat and IBES for which the 
required data items are available over the period 2002 to 2010. We start our sample from 
2002 because this is the first year that the S&P core earnings are available. We collect 
quarterly data for GAAP earnings, S&P core earnings, cash earnings and cash flows for firms 
with fiscal years ending in 2002 to 2010 from Compustat Fundamentals Quarterly file. We 
collect data for IBES earnings from IBES Actuals Detail History file and share price and 
returns data from CRSP Daily Stock file. We collect the earnings announcement date from 
Compustat. 
The initial sample consists of 167,879 firm-quarter observations (7,116 firms) after matching 
data from IBES, Compustat and CRSP data files for which the earnings announcement date is 
not missing. We impose data requirements that firms do not have missing values for variables 
in the models, not have a change of fiscal year end and have a minimum number of non-
                                                
2 The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is a method for assessing model fit that accounts for the number of 
parameters and number of observations in the model. BIC is defined as BIC = 2*ln(likelihood) + ln(N)*P , 
where N is the number of observations and P is the number of parameters in the model. As we cluster our model 
on two dimensions, firm and time, there are alternative measures of N that may be used in computing BIC. The 
value of BIC in our reported results is calculated using the total number of observations in the model. We also 
recalculate BIC using the number of firm cluster as N with similar results. 
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missing observations of 20 firm-quarters over the sample period. Further, to ensure that our 
results are not driven by extreme values, we restrict our sample to observations that are within 
two standard deviations from the mean of our variables of interest.3 Our final sample consists 
of 43,580 firm-quarter observations (1,606 firms). There are 25,912 firm-quarter observations 
(1,606 firms) in the pre-GFC (2002-2006) period and 17,668 firm-quarter observations (1,594 
firms) in the post-GFC (2007-2010) period. Table 1 presents the distribution of our sample for 
the period 2002 to 2010. 
   <Insert Table 1 about here> 
4 RESULTS 
4.1 Univariate results 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the variables for all firms in the sample. In Panel A, 
across the non-GAAP measures for the financial sector sample, mean dollar earnings per 
share range from 0.074 (CF) to 0.651 (CE) pre-GFC. On average, pre-GFC IBES earnings 
(0.545) are higher than CORE (0.515) and CF (0.074) earnings. Similarly, post-GFC, mean 
IBES earnings (0.501) are higher than CORE (0.455) and CF (-0.119) earnings. It appears 
that CORE and CF are relatively more conservative measures of earnings than IBES.  
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
The mean difference in dollar earnings per share between GAAP and non-GAAP measures 
range from -0.106 (GAAP1-CE) to 0.480 (GAAP2-CF) pre-GFC and -0.117 (GAAP1-CE) to 
0.574 (GAAP2-CF) post-GFC. Pre-GFC mean GAAP earnings are comparatively higher than 
non-GAAP earnings, with the exception of CE. Post-GFC, however, mean GAAP earnings 
                                                
3 We also relaxed this constraint to include observations that are within two and a half standard deviations from 
the mean of our variables of interest. These results are substantially similar to those reported in the main text. 
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are lower compared to IBES (GAAP2-IBES), CORE (GAAP1-CORE), and CE (GAAP1-CE 
and GAAP2-CE). Unsurprisingly, cash flows appears to be the most conservative measure of 
earnings on average in both periods.  
The mean share price (Price) at earnings announcement date is 33.199 and mean CAR is 
0.003 in the pre-GFC period, and 31.441 and 0.005, respectively, in the post-GFC period. 
Comparing the pre-GFC to the post-GFC period, mean earnings in the latter period are lower 
relative to the former across all measures of earnings. Also, the earnings surprise for all 
earnings measures is negative in the post-GFC period. 
Panel B show some contrasting results for the non-financial sector compared to the financial 
sector. With the exception of CF, all other mean earnings are comparatively higher in the 
post-GFC period relative to the pre-GFC period. In both periods, however, it appears that 
CORE and CF are more conservative measures of earnings. When compared to GAAP 
earnings, IBES and CE are higher, on average, in the pre-GFC period. Post-GFC, IBES is 
higher than GAAP1. Mean Price is comparatively higher post-GFC relative to pre-GFC. 
Panels C (S&P 500) and D (non-S&P 500) show results that are generally similar to those 
reported in Panel B. 
Generally, the results show CORE to be a relatively more conservative earnings measure than 
IBES or GAAP earnings. GAAP earnings are more conservative than IBES in the pre-GFC 
period except in the financial sector. 
4.2 Multivariate OLS Regressions 
4.2.1 Ohlson Model 
Table 3 show the results with clustered standard errors for the financial sector sample with 
share price at earnings announcement date as the dependent variable for pre-GFC and post-
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GFC periods. All models are statistically significant with an adjusted R2 ranging between 
0.4653 to 0.4854 in the pre-GFC period and 0.4019 to 0.4107 in the post-GFC period.4 For 
pre-GFC, CORE, IBES, and DIFF1 and DIFF2 for these respective earnings measures are not 
statistically significant. Our results are in contrast with prior studies that consistently show 
IBES earnings to be more value relevant than GAAP earnings. However, IBES earnings are 
significant (at 0.01) post-GFC while DIFF1 and DIFF2 remain insignificant, indicating that 
GAAP earnings do not have incremental value relevance over IBES earnings. In relation to 
CORE, however, DIFF1 and DIFF2 are significant post-GFC (at 0.001 and 0.01, 
respectively), indicating that GAAP earnings have incremental value relevance over CORE. 
In relation to CE, we find GAAP earnings to be incrementally value relevant pre-GFC with 
both DIFF1 and DIFF2 significant at 0.01. Interestingly, the coefficients for DIFF1 and 
DIFF2 are negative, indicating that GAAP earnings are more conservative (lower) than CE. 
Post-GFC, however, CE is marginally significant (at 0.05) and DIFF1 and DIFF2 are no 
longer significant. CF is not significant in both the pre-and post-GFC periods, however, 
DIFF1 and DIFF2 become marginally significant post-GFC. The results shows some evidence 
of a shift in investors’ focus on the different measures of earnings for financial firms 
Nevertheless, in both periods, the BIC ranking suggests that IBES generally ranked higher 
than CORE but lower than CE. 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
                                                
4 We test for multicollinearity using the variance inflation factor (VIF) and Condition Index due to the 
significant correlation between the independent variables in unreported correlations results. Across the samples 
for IBES, CORE and CE, for both pre-GFC and post-GFC periods, the highest mean VIF is 6.615 and the 
highest Condition Index is 12.937 suggesting that multicollinearity is not a significant problem. The highest 
mean VIF for CF is 55.315, however, the highest Condition Index is 24.519. While the highest Condition Index 
is within tolerable limit of 30 (Belsley et al., 1980), the VIF indicates potential multicollinearity problems. 




Table 4 presents the results for the non-Financial sector. All models are statistically 
significant with an adjusted R2 ranging between 0.4604 to 0.4637 in the pre-GFC period and 
0.5260 to 0.5382 in the post-GFC period. Pre-GFC, IBES is statistically significant and 
GAAP earnings do not have incremental value relevance. Post-GFC, however, DIFF2 
becomes significant and IBES becomes not significant. For the CORE models, the results are 
mixed but generally indicate that GAAP earnings have incremental value relevance relative to 
CORE. DIFF1 and CORE are statistically significant pre-GFC but DIFF1 has stronger 
significance. However, DIFF2 is significant in both the pre- and post-GFC periods but CORE 
is not significant. In relation to CE, DIFF1 is significant pre-GFC but CE has stronger 
statistical significance. DIFF2 is not significant in both pre- and post-GFC. In relation to CF, 
DIFF2 is significant (at 0.01 or stronger) both pre- and post-GFC but DIFF 1 is only 
significant pre-GFC. CF is only significant pre-GFC but at a weaker level relative to DIFF1. 
Generally, the results indicate a shift in the emphasis investors place on the different measures 
of earnings. While the results are mixed, there is also some evidence that GAAP earnings 
have incremental value relevance over non-GAAP earnings. 
In respect to how each non-GAAP earnings model performs relative to each other using BIC, 
the results are mixed for IBES and CORE. The relative performance of the models depends 
on the GAAP earnings measure used. Pre-GFC, the CORE model using DIFF1 performs 
better (ranked 3) than the corresponding IBES model (ranked 4) based on BIC. On the other 
hand, the IBES model using DIFF2 (ranked 5) performs better than the corresponding CORE 
model (ranked 6) over this same period. For CE models, in respect to DIFF1 and DIFF2, it is 
clear that they rank lower (at 7 and 8) than both IBES (at 4 and 5) and CORE (at 3 and 6) in 
the pre-GFC period but the BIC ranking improved post-GFC, in which CE (at 3 and 3) ranked 
above both IBES (at 7 and 6) and CORE (at 8 and 5) models. CF received the highest ranking 
across both periods.  
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<Insert Table 4 about here> 
The results for firms in the S&P 500 index are presented in Table 5. All models are 
statistically significant with an adjusted R2 ranging between 0.4609 to 0.4632 in the pre-GFC 
period and 0.4746 to 0.4894 in the post-GFC period. Generally, GAAP earnings have 
incremental value relevance relative to IBES, CORE and CF in both the pre- and post-GFC 
periods but have incremental value relevance relative to CE only in the pre-GFC period. The 
results indicate moderate change in investors’ focus on the various measures of earnings 
between pre-GFC and post-GFC. IBES becomes marginally significant (at 0.05) post-GFC 
relative to DIFF1 but both CORE, CE and CF become more strongly significant relative to 
DIFF1 during the GFC (at 0.05 or stronger). In both the pre-GFC and GFC periods, however, 
the results show that GAAP earnings have incremental value relevance relative to bon-GAAP 
earnings with only one exception. GAAP earnings do not have incremental value relevance 
relative to CE in the post-GFC period. In terms of model performance, the BIC ranking shows 
that CE models improve in performance, for both DIFF1 and DIFF2, from pre-GFC (at 8 and 
6) to post-GFC (at 3 and 4). For both IBES and CORE models, the results are mixed. CORE 
performs better pre-GFC but both IBES and CORE models perform equally well post-GFC. 
CF is the highest ranked model according to BIC in both the pre- and post-GFC periods. 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
For firms not included in the S&P 500 index, Table 6 shows GAAP earnings do not have 
incremental value relevance relative to IBES and CE. GAAP earnings have incremental value 
relevance relative to CORE for both the pre-GFC and GFC periods. However, GAAP 
earnings have incremental value relevance only for DIFF2 relative to CF. Using BIC to assess 
model performance, the results show that IBES ranks higher than CORE and CE in the pre-
GFC, but the ranking fell during the GFC. All models are statistically significant with an 
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adjusted R2 ranging between 0.4458 to 0.4473 in the pre-GFC period and 0.4492 to 0.4562 in 
the GFC period. 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
The difference between our results and prior studies may be because we include a variable for 
earnings forecasts (Forecast) that controls for information available to investors and 
approximates investors’ expectations. Forecast is highly significant across all the Ohlson 
models for both the pre-GFC and post-GFC periods. Our results suggest that investors find 
Forecast to be value relevant. As Forecast is highly correlated with IBES earnings, it biases 
against finding significance in IBES earnings. In untabulated results, we reestimate our 
Ohlson models omitting the Forecast variable. As expected, we find significance in IBES 
earnings across all samples. We also find IBES ranks highest, using BIC, among our models 
for all samples and for both pre- and post-GFC periods except for firms in the financial sector. 
For firms in the financial sector, IBES’s mid-level ranking in the pre-GFC period increases to 
highest ranking in the post-GFC period. Our results suggest that investors are sensitive to 
earnings forecasts. 
4.3 CAR Model 
Table 7 show the CAR model results for financial sector firms. All models are statistically 
significant.5 ESGAAP1 and ESGAAP2 are generally statistically significant except for 
ESGAAP2 relative to ESCORE in the pre-GFC period. Interestingly, ESIBES is significant 
pre-GFC but is not significant during the post-GFC period. The results for ESCORE and 
                                                
5 For the CAR model, we test for multicollinearity using variance inflation factor (VIF) due to the significant 
correlation between the independent variables in unreported correlations results. For IBES, CORE and CE, 
across all samples for both pre-GFC and GFC periods, the highest mean VIF is 7.718 and the highest Condition 
Index is 5.397 suggesting that multicollinearity is not a significant problem. However, the highest mean VIF for 
CF is 14.552 and the highest Condition Index is 7.515. As noted, the condition index is within tolerance levels, 




ESCE also show a similar pattern. These results show that GAAP earnings have incremental 
information content over non-GAAP earnings and that this is more pronounced during the 
post-GFC period. On the other hand, ESCF is not significant in the pre-GFC period but 
becomes significant in the post-GFC period. This result is consistent with the notion that in 
the post-GFC period, investors are concerned about the cash flow implications of the crisis. In 
terms of model performance, the BIC ranking shows that the relative ranking of ESIBES fell 
while ESCE and ESCF improved between the pre-GFC and post-GFC periods. 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
The results for non-financial firms are mixed depending on the GAAP earnings measure used. 
Table 8 shows ESGAAP1 is significant across all models for both the pre-GFC and GFC 
periods. Relative to ESGAAP1, ESIBES is significant whereas ESCORE and ESCE are not 
significant in either period. These results show that GAAP1 has incremental information 
content relative to IBES, CORE and CE. On the other hand, ESGAAP2 is only significant 
relative to ESCORE during the post-GFC period and marginally significant relative to ESCE 
in the pre-GFC period. ESCF becomes marginally significant in the post-GFC period, 
indicating that a shift in investor focus due to the GFC. Generally, the results show that 
ESGAAP1 has incremental information content over non-GAAP earnings across both the pre- 
and post-GFC periods. In terms of model performance, the BIC ranking indicates that 
ESIBES retains the highest ranking over both periods relative to ESCORE, ESCE and ESCF. 
<Insert Table 8 about here> 
Table 9 reports the results for firms in the S&P 500 index. All models are significant for both 
the pre- and post-GFC periods. Interestingly, for S&P 500 firms, ESGAAP1 is statistically 
significant only for the pre-GFC period relative to ESIBES, ESCORE, ESCE and ESCF, 
however, ESIBES, ESCORE and ESCF are not significant. Post-GFC, ESGAAP1 is not 
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significant across all models. On the other hand, ESGAAP 2 is only significant relative to 
ESCORE in the pre-GFC period and significant relative to ESCE and ESCF in the post-GFC 
period. While the results are mixed, there is some evidence of a shift in the informativeness of 
the various earnings measure between the pre and post-GFC periods. Comparatively, the BIC 
ranking shows that the ESIBES models outperform all other models in both periods, although 
the ESCORE models do improve in performance and rise in the ranking in the post-GFC 
period. Generally, the results show a change in the incremental information content of GAAP 
earnings before and after the GFC. 
<Insert Table 9 about here> 
Table 10 shows the results for firms not included in the S&P 500 index. All models are 
significant for both the pre-GFC and post-GFC periods. ESIBES is statistically significant in 
both the pre- and post-GFC periods. ESCORE is significant only in relation to ESGAAP2. 
ESCE is not significant in both periods and ESCF is only significant in the post-GFC period. 
ESGAAP1 is significant relative to all non-GAAP earnings for both the pre-GFC and GFC 
periods. These results indicate that ESGAAP1 has incremental information content relative to 
IBES, CORE, CE and CF measure of earnings. ESGAAP2, however, is only marginally 
significant relative to ESCE and ESCF in the pre-GFC period. Generally, there is evidence 
indicating that GAAP earnings have incremental information content relative to other non-
GAAP earnings. The model performance based on the BIC ranking remains relatively stable 
between the pre-GFC and GFC periods. 
<Insert Table 10 about here> 
4.4 Discussion 
Our results show mixed evidence of a shift in investors’ emphasis between the alternative 
measures of earnings pre-GFC and during the GFC. Generally, the two different measures of 
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GAAP earnings have a different impact on the results. Of the two GAAP earnings measures 
included in the models, GAAP1 more closely resembles IBES and CORE earnings measures. 
We find DIFF1 (based on GAAP1) and DIFF2 (based on GAAP2) to be significantly value 
relevant in the S&P 500 sample in the Ohlson model. In the GFC period, the magnitude of 
DIFF1 and DIFF2 coefficients increased in both the IBES and CORE models. In the financial 
sector, non-financial sector and non-S&P 500 samples, DIFF1 and DIFF2 are generally not 
significant in the IBES model except for DIFF2, which is significant in the post-GFC period 
in the non-financial sector sample. Overall, our results show GAAP earnings to be 
incrementally value relevant primarily for large firms when compared to IBES. Relative to 
CORE, however, GAAP earnings generally have significant incremental value relevance in 
all samples tested. Also, it appears that investors favour CE in the post-GFC period across all 
samples, and while GAAP earnings may be value relevant pre-GFC relative to CE, they 
become insignificant post-GFC. We find a shift to CF generally in the post-GFC period in 
which FC becomes more significant compared to the pre-GFC period. While the results of 
prior studies consistently show IBES to be superior to GAAP, our results only partially 
support these findings.  
In comparing model performance, our Ohlson model results provide weak support for the 
findings of prior studies. Table 11 presents a summary of model rankings using BIC for all 
sample and models. In contrast to prior studies, we find that IBES is not generally ranked as 
the best performing model in either the pre-GFC or GFC periods; which we attribute to many 
prior studies in this area using samples from pre-2002, (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2003; 
Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002). Even so, our results are not consistent with Albring et al. (2010), 
who find S&P core earnings to be more value relevant than IBES earnings in their sample of 
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large firms.6 In our results for large firms, we find CORE to be generally ranked equal with 
IBES except for the pre-GFC period only in Model 2, where CORE is ranked higher than 
IBES. In our pre-GFC results, covering nearly the same period as Albring et al. (2010), we 
also find GAAP earnings to have incremental value relevance relative to both IBES and 
CORE earnings. While our sample includes S&P 500 firms, similar to Albring et al. (2010), 
we use quarterly data and our sample period is different. This may explain the different 
results. We partitioned our sample to examine the impact that firm size, as measure by the 
S&P 500 index, and the financial sector may have on the value relevance of the different 
earnings measures. We find that the GFC impacts the alternative earnings measures 
differently across the samples.  
Our CAR models show that across all samples, GAAP earnings have incremental information 
content over IBES, CORE and CE. ESGAAP1 shows the stronger result of the two GAAP 
earnings measures. We note that all our earnings surprise measures are derived using analysts’ 
forecast from IBES. This classic errors in variables problem biases the results in favour of 
IBES earnings (Bradshaw, 2011). Therefore, our results are more conservative when 
statistical significance is found in other earnings variables.  
Our results suggest that investors place significant emphasis on GAAP earnings during the 
post-GFC period in the financial, non-financial, non-S&P 500 samples relative to IBES 
CORE and CE. Notably, however, in the S&P 500 sample, GAAP1 only has incremental 
information content in the pre-GFC period. It appears that investors place greater emphasis on 
IBES and CORE, in respect to large firms, during the GFC. Our CAR results generally 
support prior studies in respect to IBES - we find IBES to be ranked highest in both pre- and 
                                                
6 We adopted the model from Albring et al. (2010) (substituting our GAAP measures of earnings in their model) 
and tested it on a subsample comprising firms included in S&P 500 index for the period 2002 to 2007. Our 
results only partially support their findings. In order of BIC ranking, we find IBES ranked highest followed by 
GAAP1, CORE and GAAP2. 
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post-GFC periods for non-financial sector firms and for large firms. However, there is a fall in 
the BIC ranking for IBES in the post-GFC period for financial firms. 
The results of this study are generally consistent with investors shifting their focus to more 
credible and conservative earnings information. We believe the GFC caused investors to be 
more aware and wary of voluntary or non-mandated disclosures. An explanation for our 
findings may be that when investors find non-GAAP earnings informativeness to be low or 
uncertain, they place greater relative emphasis on GAAP earnings. This is the reverse of 
Lougee and Marquardt (2004), who find that pro forma earnings have relative and 
incremental information content when GAAP earnings informativeness is low.  
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study investigates the incremental value relevance of alternative measures of earnings to 
the US capital market. Our study is driven by what we perceive to be gaps in the literature. 
Much of the literature in this area focuses on GAAP vs Street earnings, however, there has 
been little research on comparing the value relevance of these measures with other alternative 
earnings measures collectively. Consequently, we focus on analyst-computed earnings 
(IBES), mandatory reported earnings (GAAP and operating cash flow), earnings computed by 
the credit agency Standard & Poor’s (CORE) and a measure commonly found in the financial 
press based on adjusting GAAP earnings (cash earnings).  
The GFC offers an opportunity to examine the impact this crisis and the associated 
uncertainty and volatility may have on the emphasis investors place on alternative measures 
of earnings in valuation decisions. In our GFC period, we find results consistent with 
investors shifting their emphasis and placing greater value relevance on GAAP earnings. 
It is argued in the literature that IBES earnings are more value relevant than GAAP earnings 
because they better reflect non-transitory earnings, which is of greater interest to investors. 
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Our results only partly support this argument. We find that IBES earnings models do not 
always rank higher than other earnings models, particularly in the GFC periods. Also, we find 
that GAAP earnings have significant incremental value relevance relative to IBES in large 
firms. 
One explanation for our results may be the time period covered in our sample and our sample 
size. Many prior studies use samples comprising earnings from fiscal years before 2005 or use 
a relatively small sample (Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; Batta and Muslu, 2010). Another 
explanation may be that the emphasis investors place on alternative earnings measures has 
changed over time. Note that our sample period covers the introduction of SOX and the global 
financial crisis. In periods of uncertainty and financial turmoil, investors may trade off 
relevance for reliability (Lobo and Zhou, 2006). GAAP earnings may be perceived to be more 
credible and reliable relative to IBES earnings. 
We believe our study contributes to the literature on the value relevance of alternative 
earnings metrics. We address more comprehensively the relative performance of six earning 
measures. Our results are of interest to standard setters and regulators on the usefulness of 
GAAP earnings relative to other measures of earnings. This may have implications on 
concerns regarding the relevance of GAAP in the capital markets. Our results suggest that 
GAAP continue to play a role in capital markets. 
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Distribution of Sample for the Period 2002 to 2010 






















Financial 3,743 263 20 2,895 260 16 6,638 263 36 
Non-Financial 22,169 1,343 20 14,773 1,334 16 36,942 1,343 36 
S&P 500 6,620 396 20 4,894 442 16 11,514 460 36 





Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Panel A – Financial Sector Sample (Pre-GFC: N = 3,743; Firms = 263 | GFC: N = 2,895; Firms = 260) 
 BV Forecast IBES CORE CE CF GAAP1-IBES GAAP2-IBES 
 Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
Mean 17.853 20.216 0.520 0.494 0.545 0.501 0.515 0.455 0.651 0.563 0.074 -0.119 0.000 0.436 0.009 -0.047 
sd 10.714 12.410 0.392 0.470 0.504 0.653 0.538 0.653 0.624 0.796 2.530 2.581 0.252 -5.970 0.276 0.431 
Minimum -1.085 -6.448 -2.140 -1.870 -5.330 -5.550 -5.362 -5.549 -5.462 -5.521 -15.113 -14.770 -2.763 -0.030 -2.716 -5.923 
25 percentile 9.796 11.125 0.270 0.200 0.270 0.180 0.229 0.154 0.312 0.219 -0.492 -0.921 -0.010 0.000 -0.005 -0.009 
50 percentile 15.801 17.651 0.440 0.390 0.460 0.400 0.428 0.363 0.536 0.465 0.540 0.413 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.004 
75 percentile 23.493 26.759 0.690 0.720 0.740 0.760 0.704 0.726 0.875 0.857 1.204 1.081 0.030 5.170 0.040 0.027 
Maximum 75.000 80.853 2.400 2.945 3.670 6.320 5.327 6.317 6.395 9.562 12.600 13.775 5.220 0.000 5.085 5.246 
                 
 GAAP1-CORE GAAP2-CORE GAAP1-CE GAAP2-CE GAAP1-CF GAAP2-CF Price ESIBES 
 Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
Mean 0.030 -0.009 0.039 0.000 -0.106 -0.117 -0.097 -0.108 0.471 0.565 0.480 0.574 33.199 31.441 0.001 -0.002 
sd 0.162 0.312 0.146 0.383 0.293 0.414 0.258 0.311 2.574 2.668 2.574 2.685 18.192 20.308 0.008 0.053 
Minimum -4.307 -4.342 -1.232 -5.241 -5.565 -8.562 -5.569 -8.556 -11.720 -14.126 -11.721 -14.524 1.300 1.410 -0.180 -1.754 
25 percentile -0.001 -0.004 0.000 -0.001 -0.126 -0.147 -0.109 -0.123 -0.671 -0.653 -0.644 -0.638 19.980 16.860 -0.001 -0.002 
50 percentile 0.008 0.001 0.015 0.001 -0.050 -0.062 -0.041 -0.049 -0.124 -0.091 -0.119 -0.085 30.020 26.850 0.000 0.000 
75 percentile 0.039 0.014 0.053 0.040 -0.006 -0.014 0.000 0.000 0.944 1.270 0.965 1.300 42.500 41.750 0.002 0.002 
Maximum 2.415 3.843 2.567 5.065 4.298 5.157 4.301 2.326 17.324 16.298 17.480 16.299 148.360 138.640 0.119 0.800 
                 
 ESCORE ESCE ESCF ESGAAP1 ESGAAP2 CAR     
 Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC     
Mean -0.001 -0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.015 -0.016 0.000 -0.004 0.001 -0.004 0.003 0.005     
sd 0.011 0.050 0.014 0.065 0.094 0.112 0.011 0.051 0.012 0.063 0.041 0.054     
Minimum -0.223 -1.753 -0.220 -1.753 -1.072 -0.837 -0.210 -1.754 -0.206 -1.753 -0.171 -0.177     
25 percentile -0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.035 -0.052 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.019 -0.027     
50 percentile 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.004     
75 percentile 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.022 0.023 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.025 0.037     
Maximum 0.122 0.799 0.197 0.803 0.743 1.202 0.121 0.794 0.193 0.802 0.178 0.177     
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Panel B – Non-Financial Sector Sample (Pre-GFC: N = 22,169; Firms = 1,343 | GFC: N = 14,773; Firms = 1,334) 
 BV Forecast IBES CORE CE CF GAAP1-IBES GAAP2-IBES 
 Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
Mean 10.102 13.135 0.307 0.403 0.318 0.420 0.259 0.360 0.522 0.665 0.047 -0.116 -0.002 0.245 -0.027 -0.068 
sd 7.560 9.674 0.362 0.451 0.392 0.517 0.463 0.577 0.687 0.862 1.701 2.290 0.175 -6.910 0.298 0.459 
Minimum -24.031 -39.044 -1.770 -3.250 -5.700 -7.340 -5.532 -7.252 -10.232 -9.884 -14.891 -15.068 -5.690 -0.020 -10.758 -11.053 
25 percentile 4.887 6.388 0.100 0.130 0.108 0.140 0.052 0.085 0.191 0.245 -0.285 -0.679 0.000 0.000 -0.019 -0.053 
50 percentile 8.453 11.076 0.250 0.340 0.260 0.360 0.217 0.312 0.423 0.557 0.289 0.353 0.000 0.010 0.002 0.000 
75 percentile 13.383 17.829 0.455 0.615 0.470 0.650 0.439 0.604 0.762 0.997 0.789 0.993 0.010 5.040 0.012 0.010 
Maximum 67.871 87.682 3.430 3.745 5.140 4.500 5.376 6.297 9.166 9.381 13.848 14.376 5.020 0.000 4.633 5.095 
                 
 GAAP1-CORE GAAP2-CORE GAAP1-CE GAAP2-CE GAAP1-CF GAAP2-CF Price ESIBES 
 Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
Mean 0.057 0.039 0.032 -0.008 -0.206 -0.266 -0.231 -0.313 0.269 0.516 0.244 0.468 25.517 30.131 0.000 0.000 
sd 0.198 0.224 0.222 0.339 0.469 0.566 0.401 0.408 1.685 2.312 1.710 2.366 16.009 20.710 0.009 0.017 
Minimum -3.367 -3.981 -10.425 -10.466 -9.066 -8.721 -9.940 -8.755 -14.028 -13.486 -14.033 -16.715 1.050 0.710 -0.773 -0.596 
25 percentile 0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.302 -0.394 -0.309 -0.408 -0.425 -0.540 -0.451 -0.579 13.970 14.990 0.000 0.000 
50 percentile 0.022 0.004 0.017 0.000 -0.139 -0.182 -0.153 -0.205 -0.095 -0.107 -0.102 -0.118 22.440 26.070 0.000 0.001 
75 percentile 0.061 0.040 0.047 0.010 -0.051 -0.072 -0.063 -0.098 0.431 0.890 0.425 0.880 33.750 40.370 0.002 0.002 
Maximum 5.888 4.609 5.501 5.086 10.824 10.424 7.650 5.254 15.211 16.687 16.381 16.687 160.300 167.900 0.077 0.510 
                 
 ESCORE ESCE ESCF ESGAAP1 ESGAAP2 CAR     
 Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC     
Mean -0.003 -0.003 0.009 0.008 -0.009 -0.014 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 0.005 0.004     
sd 0.018 0.027 0.033 0.053 0.075 0.091 0.011 0.020 0.024 0.048 0.058 0.064     
Minimum -0.631 -0.851 -1.108 -2.462 -1.567 -1.212 -0.340 -0.818 -1.056 -1.902 -0.178 -0.178     
25 percentile -0.004 -0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.023 -0.043 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.028 -0.035     
50 percentile -0.001 0.000 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.003     
75 percentile 0.001 0.002 0.015 0.016 0.020 0.023 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.039 0.045     




Panel C – S&P 500 Sample (Pre-GFC: N = 6,620; Firms = 396 | GFC: N = 4,894; Firms = 442) 
 BV Forecast IBES CORE CE CF GAAP1-IBES GAAP2-IBES 
 Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
Mean 13.303 16.606 0.502 0.632 0.519 0.656 0.446 0.580 0.783 0.968 0.072 -0.156 -0.003 0.287 -0.037 -0.077 
sd 9.771 11.911 0.406 0.505 0.451 0.583 0.542 0.655 0.777 0.987 2.264 2.919 0.172 -3.540 0.336 0.521 
Minimum -5.838 -16.124 -1.000 -3.250 -5.700 -7.340 -5.532 -7.252 -10.232 -9.884 -14.129 -15.068 -2.920 -0.030 -10.758 -11.053 
25 percentile 6.477 8.040 0.240 0.310 0.260 0.330 0.178 0.269 0.384 0.480 -0.525 -1.392 -0.010 0.000 -0.039 -0.076 
50 percentile 10.761 13.570 0.425 0.550 0.440 0.578 0.386 0.506 0.658 0.831 0.542 0.620 0.002 0.020 0.003 0.001 
75 percentile 17.272 22.235 0.660 0.885 0.690 0.930 0.654 0.859 1.069 1.351 1.149 1.349 0.020 5.170 0.017 0.016 
Maximum 75.000 68.677 3.330 3.745 3.590 4.200 5.327 6.297 6.040 9.562 13.848 14.376 5.220 0.000 5.085 5.246 
                 
 GAAP1-CORE GAAP2-CORE GAAP1-CE GAAP2-CE GAAP1-CF GAAP2-CF Price ESIBES 
 Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
Mean 0.070 0.055 0.036 0.000 -0.267 -0.333 -0.302 -0.388 0.444 0.791 0.410 0.736 35.357 41.196 0.000 0.000 
sd 0.231 0.278 0.268 0.404 0.536 0.657 0.449 0.489 2.237 2.932 2.269 2.986 18.020 23.054 0.006 0.012 
Minimum -4.307 -3.066 -10.425 -10.466 -5.790 -8.721 -5.903 -8.755 -14.028 -14.126 -14.033 -16.715 3.460 2.020 -0.250 -0.355 
25 percentile 0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.006 -0.404 -0.471 -0.417 -0.487 -0.582 -0.651 -0.618 -0.714 22.015 23.950 0.000 0.000 
50 percentile 0.027 0.013 0.020 0.001 -0.186 -0.240 -0.202 -0.260 -0.157 -0.165 -0.168 -0.182 32.797 37.275 0.000 0.001 
75 percentile 0.082 0.070 0.059 0.032 -0.067 -0.095 -0.087 -0.129 0.877 1.733 0.864 1.718 45.080 53.790 0.001 0.002 
Maximum 4.160 4.609 4.252 5.086 10.824 10.424 5.546 5.254 15.138 16.687 15.136 16.687 148.400 162.890 0.046 0.185 
                 
 ESCORE ESCE ESCF ESGAAP1 ESGAAP2 CAR     
 Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC     
Mean -0.003 -0.003 0.009 0.008 -0.013 -0.019 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 0.004 0.003     
sd 0.016 0.021 0.030 0.041 0.080 0.086 0.009 0.016 0.023 0.036 0.049 0.055     
Minimum -0.451 -0.851 -0.975 -0.884 -1.567 -1.051 -0.279 -0.584 -0.984 -0.930 -0.178 -0.178     
25 percentile -0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.032 -0.055 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.023 -0.029     
50 percentile -0.001 0.000 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.001     
75 percentile 0.001 0.001 0.014 0.014 0.019 0.019 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.033 0.035     




Panel D – Non-S&P 500 Sample (Pre-GFC: N = 19,292; Firms = 1,271 | GFC: N = 12,774; Firms = 1,231) 
 BV Forecast IBES CORE CE CF GAAP1-IBES GAAP2-IBES 
 Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
Mean 10.508 13.410 0.282 0.336 0.293 0.347 0.244 0.298 0.458 0.526 0.044 -0.102 -0.002 0.285 -0.017 -0.060 
sd 7.948 9.771 0.345 0.407 0.389 0.500 0.450 0.545 0.621 0.760 1.676 2.076 0.193 -6.910 0.280 0.426 
Minimum -24.031 -39.044 -2.140 -2.340 -5.310 -6.140 -5.207 -6.684 -8.021 -9.583 -15.113 -14.618 -5.690 -0.020 -9.077 -10.522 
25 percentile 4.930 6.573 0.090 0.098 0.090 0.100 0.046 0.055 0.171 0.176 -0.272 -0.573 0.000 0.000 -0.010 -0.038 
50 percentile 8.704 11.502 0.230 0.280 0.240 0.290 0.206 0.254 0.377 0.443 0.262 0.283 0.000 0.010 0.003 0.001 
75 percentile 14.157 18.206 0.425 0.520 0.440 0.550 0.416 0.519 0.672 0.828 0.739 0.860 0.013 5.040 0.014 0.010 
Maximum 66.078 87.682 3.430 3.700 5.140 6.320 5.376 6.317 9.166 8.193 13.774 13.504 5.020 0.000 4.633 5.095 
                 
 GAAP1-CORE GAAP2-CORE GAAP1-CE GAAP2-CE GAAP1-CF GAAP2-CF Price ESIBES 
 Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
Mean 0.047 0.022 0.032 -0.010 -0.166 -0.206 -0.181 -0.238 0.248 0.422 0.233 0.390 23.631 26.189 0.000 0.000 
sd 0.178 0.225 0.190 0.322 0.413 0.493 0.357 0.352 1.682 2.113 1.697 2.159 14.898 17.994 0.010 0.031 
Minimum -3.367 -4.342 -9.127 -10.390 -9.066 -8.185 -9.940 -8.000 -13.104 -13.334 -11.721 -13.306 1.050 0.710 -0.773 -1.754 
25 percentile 0.002 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.241 -0.299 -0.246 -0.308 -0.411 -0.520 -0.428 -0.543 13.050 13.030 0.000 -0.001 
50 percentile 0.018 0.002 0.016 0.000 -0.106 -0.131 -0.112 -0.144 -0.083 -0.088 -0.087 -0.094 20.900 22.825 0.000 0.001 
75 percentile 0.052 0.024 0.043 0.008 -0.037 -0.049 -0.043 -0.059 0.417 0.784 0.414 0.788 30.945 35.150 0.002 0.003 
Maximum 5.888 4.137 5.501 5.065 8.682 10.043 7.650 3.210 17.324 16.258 17.480 16.258 160.300 167.900 0.119 0.800 
                 
 ESCORE ESCE ESCF ESGAAP1 ESGAAP2 CAR     
 Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC     
Mean -0.003 -0.003 0.008 0.006 -0.009 -0.013 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 0.005 0.005     
sd 0.018 0.035 0.031 0.060 0.078 0.098 0.011 0.031 0.023 0.056 0.058 0.065     
Minimum -0.631 -1.753 -1.108 -2.462 -1.534 -1.212 -0.340 -1.754 -1.056 -1.902 -0.178 -0.178     
25 percentile -0.004 -0.004 0.002 0.002 -0.023 -0.042 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.028 -0.036     
50 percentile -0.001 0.000 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.004     
75 percentile 0.001 0.002 0.013 0.014 0.021 0.024 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.038 0.047     
Maximum 0.662 0.799 0.731 0.804 0.949 1.505 0.291 0.794 0.671 0.804 0.178 0.178     
Notes: The variables are defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. Forecast = IBES median consensus forecasted earnings. IBES = IBES earnings 
per share as computed by security analysts. CORE = S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. CF 
= Operating cash flows per share. GAAP1 = Earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of special items reported under GAAP. GAAP2 = Income 
38 
before extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. Price = Share price at announcement date. ESIBES = IBES minus Forecast and scaled by closing share price at t-
7. ESCORE = CORE minus Forecast and scaled by closing share price at t-7. ESCE = IBES minus Forecast and scaled by closing share price at t-7. ESCF = IBES minus 
Forecast and scaled by closing share price at t-7. ESGAAP1 = GAAP1 minus Forecast and scaled by closing share price at t-7. ESGAAP2 = GAAP2 minus Forecast and 





Ohlson Model: Financial Sector Sample 
  Multivariate OLS Regression Results at Earnings Announcement Date 
(Pre-GFC: Firm cluster = 263 and Time cluster = 20; Post-GFC: Firm cluster = 260 and Time cluster = 16) 
 Model 1: Pit = α0 + β1BVit + β2Forecastit + β3NonGAAPEit + β4DIFF1+ ε it  
 Model 2: Pit = α0 + β1BVit + β2Forecastit + β3NonGAAPEit + β4DIFF2+ ε it  
 IBES CORE CE CF 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
BV 0.688*** 0.484*** 0.683*** 0.484*** 0.681*** 0.483*** 0.663*** 0.481*** 0.633*** 0.461*** 0.633*** 0.455*** 0.678*** 0.480*** 0.676*** 0.480*** 
 (5.86) (5.13) (5.80) (5.14) (5.85) (5.18) (5.72) (5.16) (5.87) (5.10) (5.86) (5.08) (5.91) (5.20) (5.87) (5.19) 
Forecast 13.473*** 13.396*** 13.036*** 13.593*** 15.958*** 15.895*** 16.027*** 16.006*** 15.675*** 14.960*** 14.517*** 15.409*** 16.022*** 15.006*** 14.847*** 15.280*** 
 (3.63) (4.39) (3.45) (4.38) (4.65) (5.79) (4.75) (5.83) (4.76) (5.62) (4.55) (5.68) (4.76) (5.58) (4.57) (5.58) 
IBES 1.991 3.946** 2.427 3.673**             
 (1.06) (2.76) (1.25) (2.67)             
CORE     -0.209 1.765 -0.077 1.508         
     (0.13) (1.32) (0.05) (1.11)         
CE         0.407 2.772* 1.395 2.386*     
         (0.26) (2.47) (1.04) (2.12)     
CF             -0.065 2.138 1.031 1.789 
             (0.04) (1.80) (0.74) (1.54) 
DIFF1 -2.860 1.262   -0.695 4.789***   -8.532** -1.278   -0.262 2.611*   
 (0.99) (0.87)   (0.27) (3.56)   (2.97) (0.77)   (0.17) (2.34)   
DIFF2   -0.610 0.820   5.670 3.435**   -8.226** -4.065   0.835 2.260* 
   (0.29) (0.52)   (1.56) (2.96)   (2.78) (1.37)   (0.62) (2.04) 
Intercept 12.829*** 13.138*** 12.905*** 13.128*** 12.868*** 13.069*** 12.844*** 13.118*** 12.588*** 13.015*** 12.644*** 12.842*** 12.892*** 13.098*** 12.941*** 13.111*** 
 (9.60) (8.69) (9.59) (8.65) (9.60) (8.72) (9.55) (8.73) (9.72) (8.81) (9.70) (8.58) (9.61) (8.79) (9.59) (8.80) 
Adj R2 0.4681 0.4034 0.4667 0.4031 0.4653 0.403 0.4673 0.4019 0.4854 0.408 0.4836 0.4107 0.466 0.4049 0.4663 0.4046 
BIC 30012 24189 30022 24191 30032 24191 30018 24196 29888 24166 29901 24154 30026 24182 30025 24183 
BIC Rank                 
 - Pre-GFC 3  5  8  4  1  2  7  6  
 - Post-GFC  5  6  7  8  2  1  3  4 
 
40 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
The dependent variable, P, is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per 
share. Forecast = IBES median consensus forecasted earnings. IBES = IBES earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE = S&P Core earnings per share. CE = 
Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. CF = Operating cash flows per share. DIFF1 = GAAP1 minus the relevant non-GAAP 
earnings, where GAAP1 is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIFF2 = GAAP2 minus the relevant non-






Ohlson Model: Non-Financial Sector Sample 
Multivariate OLS Regression Results at Earnings Announcement Date 
(Pre-GFC: Firm cluster = 1,343 and Time cluster = 20; Post-GFC: Firm cluster = 1,334 and Time cluster = 16) 
 Model 1: Pit = α0 + β1BVit + β2Forecastit + β3NonGAAPEit + β4DIFF1+ ε it  
 Model 2: Pit = α0 + β1BVit + β2Forecastit + β3NonGAAPEit + β4DIFF2+ ε it  
 IBES CORE CE CF 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
BV 0.600*** 0.468*** 0.603*** 0.470*** 0.587*** 0.467*** 0.595*** 0.468*** 0.594*** 0.438*** 0.599*** 0.442*** 0.587*** 0.450*** 0.590*** 0.453*** 
 (11.31) (8.90) (11.35) (8.95) (11.53) (8.89) (11.62) (8.88) (11.08) (8.68) (11.03) (8.76) (11.22) (8.22) (11.31) (8.27) 
Forecast 15.441*** 23.994*** 16.183*** 24.585*** 18.409*** 24.623*** 20.988*** 25.718*** 18.100*** 24.535*** 19.880*** 24.842*** 18.677*** 25.337*** 20.479*** 25.808*** 
 (6.76) (8.51) (6.87) (9.00) (11.62) (10.84) (14.47) (11.33) (11.53) (11.21) (14.10) (12.39) (11.89) (11.50) (14.50) (13.05) 
IBES 5.579** 2.889 4.826* 2.285             
 (2.74) (1.63) (2.37) (1.46)             
CORE     2.873** 2.303 0.228 1.19         
     (2.77) (1.80) (0.27) (1.24)         
CE         2.998** 2.247 1.227** 1.960***     
         (2.87) (1.84) (3.00) (3.60)     
CF             2.486* 1.286 0.68 0.796 
             (2.36) (1.03) (1.45) (1.26) 
DIFF1 2.024 1.964   5.566*** 2.328   2.807* 0.568   2.988** 2.255   
 (1.92) (1.51)   (3.50) (1.78)   (2.55) (0.52)   (2.91) (1.92)   
DIFF2   0.628 1.851***   2.715** 2.667***   1.121 0.483   1.179** 1.752*** 
   (1.60) (3.50)   (2.85) (6.51)   (1.62) (0.55)   (2.88) (3.39) 
Intercept 12.938*** 13.135*** 12.938*** 13.203*** 12.870*** 13.146*** 12.911*** 13.206*** 12.965*** 13.142*** 12.977*** 13.154*** 12.929*** 12.994*** 12.941*** 13.050*** 
 (19.62) (16.58) (19.66) (16.87) (19.37) (16.63) (19.36) (16.86) (19.74) (16.86) (19.85) (16.68) (19.64) (17.37) (19.67) (17.65) 
Adj R2 0.4616 0.526 0.4612 0.5272 0.462 0.526 0.4612 0.5275 0.461 0.5278 0.4604 0.5278 0.4637 0.5373 0.4631 0.5382 
BIC 172191 120480 172204 120443 172171 120482 172207 120435 172214 120423 172240 120423 172103 120124 172129 120095 
BIC Rank                 
 - Pre-GFC 4  5  3  6  7  8  1  2  
 - Post-GFC  7  6  8  5  3  3  2  1 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The dependent variable, P, is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are defined as follows:  
BV = Book value of common equity per share. Forecast = IBES median consensus forecasted earnings. IBES = IBES earnings per share as computed by security analysts. 
CORE = S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. CF = Operating cash flows per share. DIFF1 = 
GAAP1 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAP1 is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of special items reported under GAAP. 




Ohlson Model: S&P 500 Sample 
Multivariate OLS Regression Results at Earnings Announcement Date 
(Pre-GFC: Firm cluster = 396 and Time cluster = 20; Post-GFC: Firm cluster = 442 and Time cluster = 16) 
 Model 1: Pit = α0 + β1BVit + β2Forecastit + β3NonGAAPEit + β4DIFF1+ ε it  
 Model 2: Pit = α0 + β1BVit + β2Forecastit + β3NonGAAPEit + β4DIFF2+ ε it  
 IBES CORE CE CF 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
BV 0.351*** 0.344*** 0.351*** 0.342*** 0.349*** 0.343*** 0.345*** 0.340*** 0.354*** 0.314*** 0.360*** 0.317*** 0.346*** 0.332*** 0.344*** 0.330*** 
 (4.53) (4.36) (4.50) (4.35) (4.55) (4.38) (4.51) (4.34) (4.57) (4.14) (4.75) (4.06) (4.33) (4.21) (4.31) (4.18) 
Forecast 22.535*** 20.569*** 23.370*** 21.878*** 20.941*** 20.966*** 23.189*** 23.411*** 20.793*** 20.966*** 22.243*** 22.887*** 21.280*** 21.636*** 22.736*** 23.832*** 
 (10.35) (5.56) (9.97) (5.44) (8.23) (7.90) (9.45) (8.15) (8.18) (8.64) (10.33) (9.84) (8.12) (8.90) (10.30) (10.37) 
IBES 1.599 5.477* 0.822 4.218             
 (0.94) (2.50) (0.39) (1.73)             
CORE     3.249* 5.101** 1.12 2.768         
     (2.28) (2.93) (0.82) (1.83)         
CE         3.290* 5.015** 1.930** 3.216***     
         (2.31) (3.08) (3.00) (4.32)     
CF             2.919 4.187** 1.530* 2.103** 
             (1.93) (2.80) (2.16) (2.90) 
DIFF1 4.791* 4.982*   4.983* 5.491*   3.306* 3.123   3.304* 5.144***   
 (2.05) (2.11)   (2.14) (2.49)   (1.96) (1.83)   (2.26) (3.48)   
DIFF2   2.244** 2.989***   3.224** 3.582***   2.566* 1.617   1.904** 3.043*** 
   (2.99) (3.54)   (2.76) (4.05)   (1.97) (1.05)   (2.89) (4.53) 
Intercept 18.549*** 19.002*** 18.614*** 19.144*** 18.401*** 18.992*** 18.510*** 19.149*** 18.508*** 18.917*** 18.656*** 18.982*** 18.391*** 18.595*** 18.470*** 18.745*** 
 (17.15) (13.33) (17.34) (13.58) (17.07) (13.34) (17.34) (13.57) (17.18) (13.46) (17.31) (13.17) (17.09) (13.55) (17.26) (13.82) 
Adj R2 0.4614 0.4746 0.4611 0.4755 0.4614 0.4746 0.4617 0.4755 0.4609 0.4772 0.4612 0.4764 0.4632 0.4891 0.4631 0.4894 
BIC 53013 41489 53016 41481 53013 41489 53010 41481 53019 41465 53015 41473 52991 41353 52992 41350 
BIC Rank                 
 - Pre-GFC 4  7  4  3  8  6  1  2  
 - Post-GFC  7  5  7  5  3  4  2  1 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The dependent variable, P, is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are defined as follows:  
BV = Book value of common equity per share. Forecast = IBES median consensus forecasted earnings. IBES = IBES earnings per share as computed by security analysts. 
CORE = S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. CF = Operating cash flows per share. DIFF1 = 
GAAP1 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAP1 is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of special items reported under GAAP. 






Ohlson Model: Non-S&P 500 Sample 
Multivariate OLS Regression Results at Earnings Announcement Date 
(Pre-GFC: Firm cluster = 1,271 and Time cluster = 20; Post-GFC: Firm cluster = 1,231 and Time cluster = 16) 
 Model 1: Pit = α0 + β1BVit + β2Forecastit + β3NonGAAPEit + β4DIFF1+ ε it  
 Model 2: Pit = α0 + β1BVit + β2Forecastit + β3NonGAAPEit + β4DIFF2+ ε it  
 IBES CORE CE CF 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
BV 0.713*** 0.459*** 0.712*** 0.460*** 0.706*** 0.457*** 0.710*** 0.459*** 0.700*** 0.434*** 0.700*** 0.421*** 0.708*** 0.446*** 0.710*** 0.448*** 
 (13.56) (8.83) (13.70) (8.87) (13.56) (8.75) (13.92) (8.84) (13.30) (8.37) (13.24) (7.88) (13.51) (8.94) (13.70) (8.97) 
Forecast 11.257*** 19.210*** 11.018*** 19.410*** 15.068*** 20.640*** 15.786*** 21.396*** 14.615*** 20.288*** 14.537*** 20.406*** 14.982*** 20.914*** 14.810*** 21.172*** 
 (5.62) (8.82) (5.50) (9.23) (9.48) (9.64) (10.37) (10.18) (9.31) (10.06) (9.66) (10.36) (9.48) (10.11) (9.81) (10.62) 
IBES 4.417** 3.026* 4.647** 2.804*             
 (2.74) (2.47) (2.97) (2.56)             
CORE     0.893 1.741 0.077 0.898         
     (1.00) (1.72) (0.10) (1.17)         
CE         1.143 1.870* 1.219* 1.744**     
         (1.31) (2.16) (2.32) (3.15)     
CF             0.843 1.15 0.937 0.832 
             (0.91) (1.06) (1.58) (1.15) 
DIFF1 -0.565 0.954   2.503 2.686*   -0.058 -0.732   1.027 1.855   
 (-0.61) (0.89)   (1.85) (2.24)   (-0.06) (-0.70)   (1.18) (1.91)   
DIFF2   0.242 1.19   3.200** 2.502***   0.053 -2.031   1.121* 1.527** 
   (0.43) (1.75)   (2.94) (5.11)   (0.07) (-1.72)   (2.12) (2.59) 
Intercept 11.671*** 12.545*** 11.683*** 12.587*** 11.633*** 12.543*** 11.603*** 12.601*** 11.626*** 12.412*** 11.629*** 12.278*** 11.680*** 12.504*** 11.692*** 12.549*** 
 (18.09) (16.13) (18.11) (16.31) (17.80) (16.16) (17.66) (16.33) (18.33) (16.57) (18.46) (16.27) (18.12) (16.58) (18.13) (16.76) 
Adj R2 0.4473 0.4497 0.4473 0.4503 0.4458 0.4492 0.4468 0.4503 0.4464 0.4539 0.4464 0.4548 0.4458 0.4556 0.4461 0.4562 
BIC 147578 102498 147579 102485 147632 102510 147595 102484 147608 102400 147608 102379 147630 102360 147619 102345 
BIC Rank                 
 - Pre-GFC 1  2  8  3  4  4  7  6  
 - Post-GFC  7  6  8  5  4  3  2  1 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The dependent variable, P, is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are defined as follows: BV 
 = Book value of common equity per share. Forecast = IBES median consensus forecasted earnings. IBES = IBES earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE 
= S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. CF = Operating cash flows per share. DIFF1 = GAAP1 
minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAP1 is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIFF2 = 








CAR Model: Financial Sector Sample 
Multivariate OLS Regression Results - 3-Day Window Centred around Earnings Announcement Date 
(Pre-GFC: Firm cluster = 263 and Time cluster = 20; Post-GFC: Firm cluster = 260 and Time cluster = 16) 
Model 3: CARi = α0 + β1ESNonGAAPi + β2ESGAAP1i + ε i
 Model 4: CARi = α0 + β1ESNonGAAPi + β2ESGAAP2i + ε i
  ESIBES ESCORE ESCE ESCF 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 
 Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
ESIBES 0.495* 0.018 0.567** -0.018             
 (2.31) (1.05) (2.59) (-0.82)             
ESCORE     0.173 0.017 0.357* 0.064         
     (1.44) (0.33) (2.06) (1.51)         
ESCE         0.149* 0.021 0.191* -0.121     
         (2.37) (0.60) (2.44) (-1.59)     
ESCF             0.009 0.024* 0.009 0.023* 
             (0.58) (2.41) (0.55) (2.27) 
ESGAAP1 0.327** 0.124***   0.405*** 0.122*   0.416*** 0.116**   0.550*** 0.140***   
 (2.88) (4.90)   (3.39) (2.30)   (4.70) (2.58)   (6.10) (5.69)   
ESGAAP2   0.222* 0.123***   0.165 0.068*   0.268* 0.232***   0.446*** 0.111*** 
   (2.01) (4.58)   (0.94) (2.04)   (2.42) (3.43)   (5.40) (6.02) 
Intercept 0.003 0.005** 0.003 0.005** 0.003 0.005** 0.003* 0.005** 0.002 0.005** 0.002 0.005*** 0.003 0.005*** 0.003 0.005*** 
 (1.73) (2.90) (1.70) (2.90) (1.95) (2.91) (1.98) (2.88) (1.52) (2.90) (1.47) (3.34) (1.87) (3.53) (1.83) (3.50) 
Adj R2 0.0284 0.0168 0.0263 0.0158 0.0228 0.0167 0.0200 0.0167 0.0234 0.0169 0.0193 0.0172 0.0226 0.0191 0.0184 0.0181 
BIC -13413 -8733 -13405 -8730 -13392 -8732 -13381 -8733 -13394 -8733 -13379 -8734 -13391 -8740 -13375 -8737 
BIC Rank                 
 - Pre-GFC 1  2  4  6  3  7  5  8  
 - Post-GFC  4  8  7  4  4  3  1  2 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
The dependent variable, CAR, is the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns over a three-day window centred around the earnings announcement date. Other variables 
are defined as follows: ESIBES = IBES minus Forecast. ESCORE = CORE minus Forecast. ESCE = IBES minus Forecast. ESCF = IBES minus Forecast.  
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ESGAAP1 = GAAP1 minus Forecast, where GAAP1 is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of special items reported under GAAP. ESGAAP2 
= GAAP2 minus Forecast, where GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. All earnings minus forecast variables are scaled by share 
price at t-7 
49 
Table 8 
CAR Model: Non-Financial Sector Sample 
Multivariate OLS Regression Results - 3-Day Window Centred on Earnings Announcement Date 
(Pre-GFC: Firm cluster = 1,343 and Time cluster = 20; Post-GFC: Firm cluster = 1,334 and Time cluster = 16) 
Model 3: CARi = α0 + β1ESNonGAAPi + β2ESGAAP1i + ε i
 Model 4: CARi = α0 + β1ESNonGAAPi + β2ESGAAP2i + ε i
  ESIBES ESCORE ESCE ESCF 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 
 Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
ESIBES 0.556** 0.277** 0.695*** 0.353**             
 (3.10) (3.06) (3.48) (3.28)             
ESCORE     -0.031 0.054 0.194*** 0.257***         
     (-0.84) (1.07) (4.37) (5.22)         
ESCE         -0.008 -0.022 0.004 0.014     
         (-0.45) (-1.19) (0.25) (0.55)     
ESCF             0.006 0.019* 0.007 0.020** 
             (0.64) (2.22) (0.80) (2.60) 
ESGAAP1 0.354*** 0.182**   0.542*** 0.222**   0.516*** 0.311***   0.507*** 0.280**   
 (3.59) (3.27)   (4.82) (2.61)   (4.59) (3.70)   (4.46) (3.13)   
ESGAAP2   -0.003 0.009   -0.010 -0.055**   0.093* 0.043   0.098* 0.059 
   (-0.12) (0.44)   (-0.31) (-2.61)   (2.37) (0.77)   (2.57) (1.44) 
Intercept 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (5.97) (4.83) (5.89) (4.44) (6.10) (5.23) (6.37) (5.32) (6.04) (5.77) (6.31) (4.88) (6.04) (5.08) (6.08) (5.00) 
Adj R2 0.0159 0.0120 0.0120 0.0094 0.0090 0.0077 0.0032 0.0063 0.0090 0.0077 0.0015 0.0017 0.0090 0.0082 0.0016 0.0025 
BIC -63542 -39307 -63454 -39267 -63387 -39242 -63259 -39222 -63387 -39242 -63220 -39154 -63387 -39250 -63222 -39165 
BIC Rank                 
 - Pre-GFC 1  2  3  6  3  8  3  7  
 - Post-GFC  1  2  4  6  4  8  3  7 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
The dependent variable, CAR, is the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns over a three-day window centred around the earnings announcement date. Other variables 
are defined as follows: ESIBES = IBES minus Forecast. ESCORE = CORE minus Forecast. ESCE = IBES minus Forecast. ESCF = IBES minus Forecast.  
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ESGAAP1 = GAAP1 minus Forecast, where GAAP1 is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of special items reported under GAAP. ESGAAP2 
= GAAP2 minus Forecast, where GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. All earnings minus forecast variables are scaled by share 




CAR Model: S&P 500 Sample 
Multivariate OLS Regression Results - 3-Day Window Centred on Earnings Announcement Date 
(Pre-GFC: Firm cluster = 396 and Time cluster = 20; Post-GFC: Firm cluster = 442 and Time cluster = 16) 
Model 3: CARi = α0 + β1ESNonGAAPi + β2ESGAAP1i + ε i
 Model 4: CARi = α0 + β1ESNonGAAPi + β2ESGAAP2i + ε i
  ESIBES ESCORE ESCE ESCF 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 
 Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
ESIBES 0.632 0.334*** 0.979* 0.400**             
 (1.42) (3.33) (2.35) (2.79)             
ESCORE     0.019 0.144** 0.362*** 0.271***         
     (0.19) (2.70) (4.97) (3.56)         
ESCE         -0.056* -0.012 -0.026 -0.036     
         (-2.22) (-1.08) (-0.69) (-0.89)     
ESCF             0.007 0.016 0.011 0.016 
             (0.55) (1.41) (0.77) (1.38) 
ESGAAP1 0.360** 0.102   0.567*** 0.138   0.652*** 0.264   0.586*** 0.251   
 (2.63) (0.63)   (3.46) (0.89)   (6.10) (1.74)   (5.54) (1.66)   
ESGAAP2   -0.029 0.012   -0.128*** -0.056   0.080 0.093*   0.057 0.058* 
   (-0.48) (0.52)   (-4.30) (-1.24)   (0.90) (2.43)   (0.73) (2.20) 
Intercept 0.004*** 0.002* 0.004*** 0.002* 0.004*** 0.003** 0.005*** 0.003** 0.005*** 0.003** 0.005*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.005*** 0.003** 
 (3.84) (2.19) (3.61) (2.09) (3.98) (2.72) (4.50) (2.71) (4.67) (2.59) (4.55) (2.86) (4.13) (2.61) (4.22) (2.60) 
Adj R2 0.0167 0.0083 0.0136 0.0077 0.0125 0.0069 0.0074 0.0065 0.0135 0.0048 0.0005 0.0013 0.0126 0.0054 0.0007 0.0017 
BIC -21250 -14472 -21229 -14470 -21222 -14465 -21188 -14463 -21229 -14455 -21142 -14438 -21222 -14458 -21143 -14440 
BIC Rank                 
 - Pre-GFC 1  2  4  6  2  8  4  7  
 - Post-GFC  1  2  3  4  6  8  5  7 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
The dependent variable, CAR, is the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns over a three-day window centred around the earnings announcement date. Other variables 
are defined as follows: ESIBES = IBES minus Forecast. ESCORE = CORE minus Forecast. ESCE = IBES minus Forecast. ESCF = IBES minus Forecast.  
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ESGAAP1 = GAAP1 minus Forecast, where GAAP1 is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of special items reported under GAAP. ESGAAP2 
= GAAP2 minus Forecast, where GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. All earnings minus forecast variables are scaled by share 




CAR Model: Non-S&P 500 Sample 
Multivariate OLS Regression Results - 3-Day Window Centred on Earnings Announcement Date 
(Pre-GFC: Firm cluster = 1,271 and Time cluster = 20; Post-GFC: Firm cluster = 1,231 and Time cluster = 16) 
Model 3: CARi = α0 + β1ESNonGAAPi + β2ESGAAP1i + ε i
 Model 4: CARi = α0 + β1ESNonGAAPi + β2ESGAAP2i + ε i
  ESIBES ESCORE ESCE ESCF 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 
 Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
ESIBES 0.539*** 0.098** 0.658*** 0.159***             
 (3.29) (2.78) (3.64) (3.97)             
ESCORE     -0.045 0.030 0.155*** 0.181***         
     (-0.90) (0.48) (3.45) (5.40)         
ESCE         0.012 -0.005 0.023 0.017     
         (0.56) (-0.22) (1.08) (0.51)     
ESCF             0.006 0.021** 0.007 0.022*** 
             (0.69) (3.11) (0.78) (3.48) 
ESGAAP1 0.340*** 0.136***   0.543*** 0.166**   0.485*** 0.201***   0.496*** 0.197***   
 (3.65) (4.00)   (5.74) (2.98)   (4.64) (5.60)   (4.63) (5.27)   
ESGAAP2   0.013 0.023   0.040 -0.019   0.110* 0.055   0.131** 0.075 
   (0.53) (0.86)   (1.32) (-0.71)   (2.51) (0.91)   (2.80) (1.91) 
Intercept 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 (6.07) (6.12) (6.03) (5.83) (6.12) (6.11) (6.39) (6.22) (5.80) (6.28) (6.05) (5.99) (6.04) (6.26) (6.11) (6.29) 
Adj R2 0.0169 0.0098 0.0129 0.0074 0.0095 0.0086 0.0034 0.0071 0.0094 0.0085 0.0025 0.0037 0.0094 0.0095 0.0026 0.0047 
BIC -55277 -33556 -55200 -33525 -55132 -33540 -55016 -33520 -55131 -33539 -54998 -33477 -55132 -33551 -54998 -33490 
BIC Rank                 
 - Pre-GFC 1  2  3  6  5  7  3  7  
 - Post-GFC  1  5  3  6  4  8  2  7 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
The dependent variable, CAR, is the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns over a three-day window centred around the earnings announcement date. Other variables 
are defined as follows: ESIBES = IBES minus Forecast. ESCORE = CORE minus Forecast. ESCE = IBES minus Forecast. ESCF = IBES minus Forecast. ESGAAP1 = 
GAAP1 minus Forecast, where GAAP1 is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of special items reported under GAAP. ESGAAP2 = GAAP2 






Summary of BIC Ranking by Model and Sample  
 
Panel A - Ohlson Model 
Earnings 
Measure 
Financial Non-Financial S&P 500 Non-S&P 500 
DIFF1 DIFF2 DIFF1 DIFF2 DIFF1 DIFF2 DIFF1 DIFF2 
Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
IBES 3 5 5 6 4 7 5 6 4 7 7 5 1 7 2 6 
CORE 8 6 4 8 3 8 6 5 4 7 3 5 8 8 3 5 
CE 1 2 2 1 7 3 8 3 8 3 6 4 4 4 4 3 
CF 7 3 6 4 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 7 2 6 1 
 
Panel B - CAR Model 
Earnings 
Measure 
Financial Non-Financial S&P 500 Non-S&P 500 
ESGAAP1 ESGAAP2 ESGAAP1 ESGAAP2 ESGAAP1 ESGAAP2 ESGAAP1 ESGAAP2 
Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
ESIBES 1 4 2 8 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 5 
ESCORE 4 7 6 4 3 4 6 6 4 3 6 4 3 3 6 6 
ESCE 3 4 7 3 3 4 8 8 2 6 8 8 5 4 7 8 
ESCF 5 1 8 2 3 3 7 7 4 5 7 7 3 2 7 7 
IBES = IBES earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE = S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and 
amortisation expenses. CF = Operating cash flows per share. DIFF1 = GAAP1 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAP1 is earnings per share from operations 
adjusted to exclude the effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIFF2 = GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAP2 is income before 
extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. ESIBES = IBES minus Forecast. ESCORE = CORE minus Forecast. ESCE = IBES minus Forecast. ESCF = IBES minus 
Forecast. ESGAAP1 = GAAP1 minus Forecast. ESGAAP2 = GAAP2 minus Forecast. Forecast = IBES median consensus forecasted earnings. All earnings minus forecast 
variables are scaled by share price at t-7  
 
 
